# Introduction

We’re going to manually roll the ZSK (Zone Signing Key) for the zones we have signed.

## Notes

- Commands preceded with “$” imply that you should execute the command as a general user - not as root.
- Commands preceded with “#” imply that you should be working as root.
- Commands with more specific command lines (e.g. “rtrX>” or “mysql>”) imply that you are executing commands on remote equipment, or within another program.

# On your authritative server (SOA)

PLEASE make note of the KSK/ZSK IDs and write them down on a piece of paper as you work to remember which is which.

## Reminders

- We are keeping our keys in `/etc/bind/keys/`

- We currently have two pairs of keys in that directory, one ZSK and one KSK.

- Each pair is represented by two files, one ending in “.key” (the public key) and one ending in “.private” (the private key)

- there is a DS RRSet in the “root” zone corresponding to our KSK

## ZSK Rollover

### Inspect existing keys

Take a look at what keys we have already generated. Make a note of the names of the files containing the current ZSK and KSK.

    # cd /etc/bind/keys/
    # ls -lt K*

### Generate a new ZSK

We’ll be creating a new ZSK, to replace the old one.

    # dnssec-keygen -r /dev/urandom -a RSASHA256 -b 2048 -n ZONE MYTLD

Note: Replace MYTLD with the name of your zone!

You will get output similar to:

    KMYTLD.+008+45000

Mak a note of this Key ID on a piece of paper:

    ZSK 2 : 45000 (replace with what you got)

Make sure all the keyfiles are readable by the named process:

    # chown bind K*
    # chmod u+r K*
    # ls -lt

You should now have a third key pair in the directory. If you check the DNSKEY RDATA (e.g., `cat KMYTLD.+008+45000.key`), you should see the flags field is 256 (i.e. this is a ZSK, not a KSK).

Make a note of the name of the file containing the new ZSK.

### Inspect current DNSKEY RRSet.

    # dig @10.0.0.252 MYTLD dnskey +multi

Your zone should contain one KSK and one ZSK (check the flags - 257/256 - to distinguish between them).

We need to add the new key to the zone, so it gets included in the next signing. At the end of the file /etc/bind/master/MYTLD, ADD the new key:

    $include "/etc/bind/keys/KMYTLD.+008+45000.key";

Note: Increment the serial number.

Save the file and exit

### Re-sign zone

We will need to get the new ZSK signed, but we will NOT sign zone data using the new ZSK. Initially, we only want the new ZSK to show up in the DNSKEY RRset alongside the existing one, and be signed by the current KSK.

This is called a “pre publish”.

    # cd /etc/bind/keys
    # dnssec-signzone -x -o MYTLD -k KMYTLD.+008+52159 ../master/MYTLD KMYTLD.+008+51333

Note: key tag numbers from the manual signing example, replace with yours.

Notice in the above example that we are only using the current (old) ZSK and old KSK to sign, not the new one - this is to make sure that dnssec-signzone doesn’t try to sign with both ZSKs. It wouldn’t be “bad”, but it would mean twice the data in the zone, one set of signaures having been generated using a KEY that hasn’t been widely distributed yet.

We therefore `dnssec-signzone` explicitly which keys to use when doing a rollover, PRECISELY because you want to control the timing of when a key is introduced, used to sign, and finally retired.

The output of the above command should be:

    Zone signing complete:
    Algorithm: RSASHA256: KSKs: 1 active, 0 stand-by, 0 revoked
                          ZSKs: 1 active, 1 present, 0 revoked
    ../master/MYTLD.signed

Notice the ZSKs: 1 active, 1 present

## See what difference this has made to the zone.

First, make BIND reload the newly signed zone:

    # rndc reload MYTLD

Then, check the zone contents:

    # dig @10.X.1.1 MYTLD dnskey +multi
    # dig @10.X.1.1 MYTLD dnskey +dnssec +multi
    # dig @10.X.1.1 MYTLD soa +dnssec

Your zone should now contain one KSK and two ZSKs; both ZSKs should be present in the DNSKEY RRSet, which should be signed by the KSK.

BUT the SOA record (and other RRSets in the zone) should be signed only once, using the old ZSK. And the DNSKEY RRset should show all 3 keys (1 KSK, 2 ZSKs).

This is called “pre-publish”.

At this time, we should wait 2 x TTL for both ZSKs to show up in everyone’s cache (by default it is 120 seconds, or 2 minutes, in our lab, but this will be different “in real life”).

Let’s wait for at least 2 minutes before we sign with the new ZSK instead of the old ZSK.

After 2 minutes, ask one of your neighbors if they can lookup the DNSKEY for your domain. They can check the in-class cache (10.0.0.252) and, if they have configured it, their own caching resolver.

Again, the command to lookup the keys is:

    # dig @10.10... MYTLD dnskey +multi

Once we are certain that “all the internet” (everyone in the class) can see both keys, we can sign with the new ZSK.

## Sign with the new ZSK.

Remember, we have 3 keys - in our zone, we have:

    $include "/etc/bind/keys/KMYTLD.+008+52159.key"; // KSK
    $include "/etc/bind/keys/KMYTLD.+008+51333.key"; // ZSK we retire
    $include "/etc/bind/keys/KMYTLD.+008+45000.key"; // new ZSK

Don’t change any of these! But increment the serial number, then:

    # cd /etc/bind/keys
    # dnssec-signzone -x -o MYTLD -k KMYTLD.+008+52159 ../master/MYTLD KMYTLD.+008+45000

… Notice how we now use 45000 (new, second ZSK) to sign, not 51333 (old, previous ZSK) anymore.

Now, reload the zone to propagage the changes:

    # rndc reload MYTLD

Check with dig like in step 5 that you are seeing only ONE signature for your RRsets - which means we are only signing using ONE ZSK - you still have to wait for the TTL to expire before you can retire the old ZSK.

## Verify that we are only signing with 1 key

Use `dig` like earlier, to verify that we are only signing zone data with one ZSK.

    # dig @10.X.1.1 www.MYTLD +dnssec

But also verify that the OLD ZSK is still published (but not used to sign) in the DNSKEY RRset:

    # dig @10.X.1.1 MYTLD dnskey +multi

You should still see three keys.

After 2 minutes you should still see the AD bit set. Verify:

    # dig MYTLD SOA +dnssec

… which indicates that during this rollover, the zone continues to validate and thus the zone is still secure.

## Retire the old ZSK.

After waiting at least 2 minutes (120s) for caches to clear, retire the old ZSK:

    # cd /etc/bind/master/

Edit the zone file and add a comment sign (‘;’) in front of the old ZSK (double check which key!)

    $include "/etc/bind/keys/KMYTLD.+008+52159.key";    // KSK
    ; $include "/etc/bind/keys/KMYTLD.+008+51333.key";  // ZSK (commented out)
    $include "/etc/bind/keys/KMYTLD.+008+45000.key";    // new ZSK

Increment the serial number.

Now resign the zone, but you will notice that we explicitly DON’T specify the ZSK we just commented. Since there is only one ZSK in the zone, we don’t need to say which one to use.

    # cd /etc/bind/keys
    # dnssec-signzone -x -o MYTLD -k KMYTLD.+008+52159 ../master/MYTLD
    # rndc reload MYTLD
    # tail /etc/bind/log/general

## Verify that the old ZSK is no longer published

Like earlier, check that signatures still validate, and that the OLD KZK is no longer in the RRset.

Also, check the RRSIGs (dig +dnssec soa MYTLD) in your zone show the key ID of the new ZSK. Hint: `dig MYTLD +dnssec +multi`

Does your domain still work ? :)