Security introduction

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Main Security Concerns

- Confidentiality
  - Keeping our data safe from prying eyes
- Integrity
  - Protecting our data from loss or unauthorised alteration
- Authentication and Authorisation
  - Is this person who they claim to be?
  - Is this person allowed to do this?
- Availability
  - Are our systems working when we need them? (Denial of Service)

Security Implications of connecting to the Internet

- The Internet lets you connect to millions of hosts
  - but they can also connect to you!
- Many points of access (e.g. telephone, X25)
  - even if you can trace an attack to a point on the Internet, the real source may be untraceable
- Your host runs many Internet services
  - many potential points of vulnerability
  - many servers run as "root" !

Network-based attacks

- Passive attacks
  - e.g. packet sniffers, traffic analysis
- Active attacks
  - e.g. connection hijacking, IP source spoofing, exploitation of weaknesses in IP stack or applications
- Denial of Service attacks
  - e.g. synflood
- Attacks against the network itself
  - e.g. smurf

Other common attacks

- Brute-force and Dictionary attacks (password guessing)
- Viruses
- Trojan horses
- Humans are often the weakest link
  - "Hi, this is Bob, what's the root password?"

Authentication: Passwords

- Can be guessed
- If too complex, users tend to write them down
- If sent unencrypted, can be "sniffed" from the network and re-used

Choosing good passwords

- Combinations of upper and lower-case letters, numbers and symbols
  - 'brute force' attacker has to try many more combinations
- Not in any dictionary, including hackers dictionaries

$40&yc4f
"Money for nothing and your chicks for free"

wsR!vst?
"workshop students aRe not very sleepy today ?"

Authentication: Source IP address

- Not verified by the network (since not used in datagram delivery)
- Datagrams are easily forged
- TCP 3-way handshake gives some degree of protection, as long as you can't guess TCP sequence numbers
  - Legitimate example: controlling SMTP relaying by source IP address
- Any UDP protocol is completely vulnerable
  - e.g. NFS

Authentication: Host name

- Very weak
- DNS is easily attacked (e.g. by loading false information into cache)
- Slight protection by ensuring that reverse and forward DNS matches
  - e.g. Connection received from 80.248.72.254
  - Lookup 80.248.72.254 -> noc.ws.afnog.org
  - Lookup noc.ws.afnog.org -> 80.248.72.254
- This is why many sites won't let you connect unless your forward and reverse matches

Cryptographic methods

- Can provide REALLY SECURE solutions to authentication, privacy and integrity
- Some are hard to implement, many different tools, usually requires special clients
- Export and usage restrictions (less of a problem these days)
- Take care to understand where the weaknesses lie

Simple combinations

- The lock on your front door can be picked
- Two locks are better than one
- The thief is more likely to try somewhere else

IP source address AND password authentication

- xinetd has IP-based access controls
- Some services include "tcp wrappers" (/etc/hosts.allow) to configure IP source authentication
  - For info and examples: man 5 hosts_access
- The application also typically has password authentication

UNDERSTAND what you're doing

- A bad security solution is worse than no security at all
- Know what you're doing
  - Read all the documentation
  - Read sample configurations
  - Build test machines
  - Ask questions
  - Join the announcements mailing list for your O/S and applications
- Test what you've done
  - Try connecting from outside your network
  - Try circumventing your own rules

Summary

- Disable all services which are not needed
- Apply security patches promptly; join the announcement mailing lists
- Good password management
- Combine passwords with IP access controls where possible
- Use cryptographic methods where possible