


2-4-2


Protecting

Network Infrastructure

Routers, Switches, etc.




- **Could Spy on Protocols, Data, or Configuration**
- **Could Alter Protocols, Data, or Configuration**
- **Would Require Vendor Collusion**
- **Nation State Attack**
- **No Longer Unlikely**
- **Only Protection is Code Audit**



**Trojan
Horses
in Code**

- DDoS is Continual Every Day in Large Networks
- Mitigation Techniques such as Black Hole
- Crafted Packets Exploit Weakness in Vendor Code
E.g. IPv6 HDR0, etc.
- Filter & Patch is all you can do



Packet Attacks DDoS
Crafted Packets

ACLs

Access Control Lists



NTP ACLs

```
! Core NTP configuration
ntp server 209.20.186.192           ! ntp.psg.com
ntp server 147.28.0.36             ! rip.psg.com
ntp server 147.28.0.62             ! psg.com
!
ntp source Loopback0
!
access-list 46 remark utility ACL to block everything
access-list 46 deny any
!
access-list 47 remark NTP peers/servers we sync to/with
access-list 47 permit 209.20.186.192
access-list 47 permit 147.28.0.36
access-list 47 permit 147.28.0.62
access-list 47 deny any
!
! NTP access control
ntp access-group query-only 46     ! deny all NTP control queries
ntp access-group serve 46          ! deny all NTP by default
ntp access-group peer 47           ! permit sync to peer(s)/server(s)
ntp access-group serve-only 46     ! deny NTP time sync requests
```

- Routing was Designed With no Concern for Security
- Attacks can be Close or Remote, e.g. YouTube Incident


**Routing
Protocol
Attacks**

IS-IS
OSPF
BGP
LDP



- IS-IS a bit Less Vulnerable as it is not Over IP, it is CLNP
- Use MD5 Auth for Authentication
- Other Protections Very Active in IETF

- Assume Monkeys are in the Middle
- Authenticate all Control Traffic, MD5 or Stronger
- Teach Customers to Encrypt: https, imaps, ssh, ...
- WPA2 (enterprise) on WiFi



MD5 Auth

```
neighbor 199.238.113.9 remote-as 2914
```

```
neighbor 199.238.113.9 description verio customer aggregation
```

```
neighbor 199.238.113.9 password 7 0117575757581E172045
```



Protects against MITM resets Fake Peers

IS-IS

- Is Layer-2, CLNP, not Layer-3
- So Can Not be Attacked Remotely
- Has Other Advantages over OSPF, such as Scaling to 1,000 routers
- Most Larger Providers Run IS-IS

- Occasional New Ones
- Usually against ASN.1
- Network may be Mapped
- Traffic may be Monitored
- Configuration may be Changed
- Use ACLs on What Host may SNMP
- Defense is Using SNMPv3 which is Encrypted

SNMP
Attacks



Simple SNMP Precaution

```
! snmp pollers
```

```
access-list 98 permit 129.250.32.0 0.0.0.255
```

```
access-list 98 permit 129.250.42.0 0.0.0.63
```

```
access-list 98 permit 147.28.0.35
```

```
access-list 98 permit 147.28.0.60
```

```
!
```


```
snmp-server enable traps bgp
```

```
snmp-server enable traps config
```

```
snmp-server enable traps envmon
```

```
snmp-server community <secret> R0 98
```


- Tapping Configuration Session
 - Stealing Password
 - Stealing Configuration
- DO NOT USE Telnet
- Configure Over ssh
- Restrict ssh to Special Hosts



ssh Access Control List

```
line vty 0 4
  secret 5 071C205F4600140C5C
  exec-timeout 0 0
  transport input ssh
  access-class vty4 in
  ipv6 access-class vty6 in
  transport preferred none




ip access-list standard vty4
  permit 147.28.0.0 0.0.7.255
  permit 198.180.150.0 0.0.0.255
  permit 198.180.152.0 0.0.0.255
!
ipv6 access-list vty6
  permit ipv6 2001:418:1::/48 any
```



Cisco password 'encryption' is trivial to attack
So protect your configurations!

- Protect Your Provisioning
- Against Intrusion and Employees
- Isolate and Protect Servers
- Secure All Inter-System Communication
- Two-Factor Authenticate all Access

**Corrupt
Config
Database**



It Is Not A Friendly World

