Zone signing with OpenDNSSEC - part 1 1. Initialize the Software "Hardware Security Module" Start by becoming root for this session (or use sudo when required) $ sudo -s # # mkdir /var/lib/softhsm/tokens # softhsm2-util --init-token --slot 0 --label OpenDNSSEC (use '1234' for both questions below): === SO PIN (4-255 characters) === Please enter SO PIN: **** Please reenter SO PIN: **** === User PIN (4-255 characters) === Please enter user PIN: **** Please reenter user PIN: **** The token has been initialized. # softhsm2-util --show-slots 2. Modify /etc/opendnssec/conf.xml to use the SoftHSM Find the section And remove the comments () before and after. Also, set the correct path for the libsofthsm.so in the conf.xml: Change: /usr/lib/softhsm/libsofthsm.so to /usr/lib/softhsm/libsofthsm2.so In the end you should have: /usr/lib/softhsm/libsofthsm2.so OpenDNSSEC 1234 2. Change the default Policy to use NSEC instead of NSEC3: Edit /etc/opendnssec/kasp.xml Find this section, and remove all the lines from ... P100D 1 5 ... and replace them with this single line: Save & exit. 3. Initialise the database # ods-enforcer-db-setup *WARNING* This will erase all data in the database; are you sure? [y/N] y Database setup successfully. # chmod 755 /var/lib/opendnssec # mkdir /var/lib/opendnssec/enforcer # mkdir /var/lib/opendnssec/signer # chown opendnssec:opendnssec /var/lib/opendnssec/enforcer # chown opendnssec:opendnssec /var/lib/opendnssec/signer Restart the enforcer: Import default policy (from /etc/opendnssec/conf.xml) # ods-enforcer policy import Created policy default successfully Created policy lab successfully policy import completed in 0 seconds. 4. Install a copy of the unsigned zone for OpenDNSSEC to sign Let's use the backup of our master zone and make it available to opendnssec (that file should NOT have any '$include' statements). # cd /etc/bind/master # cp mytld.backup /var/lib/opendnssec/unsigned/mytld Increment the serial in the mytld file, so that it's up-to-date (YYYYMMDDXY). 5. Add the zone to OpenDNSSEC's database: # ods-enforcer zone add --zone mytld input is set to /var/lib/opendnssec/unsigned/mytld. output is set to /var/lib/opendnssec/signed/mytld. Zone mytld added successfully zone add completed in 0 seconds. 6. Restart the signer # service opendnssec-signer restart 7. Check that the zone is signed # ls -l /var/lib/opendnssec/signed/ -rw-r--r-- 1 root wheel 2621 Feb 19 09:10 mytld Take a look at the contents of the zone - note the key ids for the KSK and ZSK. If for some reason, you don't see a file in this directory (/usr/local/var/opendnssec/signed/), then force the signer to sign: # ods-signer sign mytld 9. Moment of reflection Ok, so now the zone is signed with OpenDNSSEC - do notice that the zone was signed, but you didn't issue any commands to generate keys. List the keys currently managed by OpenDNSSEC: # ods-enforcer key list Keys: Zone: Keytype: State: Date of next transition: mytld KSK publish 2014-03-21 04:25:30 mytld ZSK active 2014-03-21 04:32:30 Notice that two keys have just been created by OpenDNSSEC, on the fly. But BIND is still loading the zone that was signed earlier (either manually or using the inline signer) - can we just modify the named.conf definition and point to the signed zone instead ? Which KSK is currently being used ? And which DS record is published in the parent zone ? Would the resolvers be able to verify the signatures on the zone signed with OpenDNSSEC ? Why not ? What would you have to do for it to work (there are several possible answers) If you don't care about the validation problem, then you can proceed with the rest of this lab. 10. Tell BIND to load the new zone Modify /etc/bind/named.conf.local, and change the zone definition for "mytld" so it looks like this (REMOVE auto-dnssec, etc...) zone "mytld" { file "/var/lib/opendnssec/signed/mytld"; // <--- Change path type master; key-directory "/etc/bind/keys"; // <--- Remove if there auto-dnssec maintain; // <--- Remove if there inline-signing yes; // <--- Remove if there }; Now, BIND is back to being a "passive" nameserver that doesn't sign the zone - it just serves the zone signed by OpenDNSSEC. Restart named: # service named restart Check the logs in /etc/namedb/log/general to make sure that the zone is loading correctly. Now, validation will probably fail for those trying to look up data in your zone. Wait a few minutes, and try to lookup a record in your zone: # dig @127.0.0.1 www.mytld +dnssec What do you notice ? 11. OpenDNSSEC reload BIND Even better, you can have OpenDNSSEC tell BIND to reload the zone when it has been signed - like this, no need to manually reload. To do this, modify /etc/opendnssec/conf.xml Find the lines: ... remove the comments (the lines '') before and after. Save the file, and restart OpenDNSSEC: # ods-control stop ... # ods-control start 12. Export the DS, ready to upload: Verify the state of the KSK at this stage: # ods-enforcer key list Note the state that the KSK is in. If it is still in publish state (see https://wiki.opendnssec.org/display/DOCS/Key+States#KeyStates-Publish for reference), then the key is, from OpenDNSSEC's point of view, not ready to be used, as it hasn't had time to propagate. You can still export the DS record, derived from the KSK: # ods-enforcer key export --zone mytld --ds --keystate publish Note the warning! WARNING: No active or ready keys seen for this zone. Do not load any DS records to the parent unless you understand the possible consequences. Ok, let's send the DS to a file, so we can upload it: # ods-enforcer key export --zone mytld --ds --keystate publish >/tmp/dsset-mytld. 13. Upload the DS to the server # scp /tmp/dsset-mytld. admin@a.root-servers.net: 14. Notify the administrator! Ask the root operator to add the new DS to the root zone, and see how long it takes before validation starts working again for your zone. 15. What's with the keystate ? Why is the key in Publish state ? Why is OpenDNSSEC reluctant to let us use the key right away ? Was it a good idea to upload the DS already ? If you wait long enough, you will see this: Keys: Zone: Keytype: State: Date of next transition: mytld KSK ready waiting for ds-seen mytld ZSK retire 2014-03-21 07:50:38 mytld ZSK active 2014-03-21 07:54:38 In reality, we should have waited until the key was marked as "ready" before we published the DS! Why ? There was a risk the zone information wasn't fully propagated (think secondaries and caches). Only once the key is marked as ready is it safe to upload the DS. OpenDNSSEC uses the parameters in the policy settings (kasp.xml) to determine this. 16. Informing OpenDNSSEC that the DS is seen in the parent zone Once you have seen the DS in the parent zone, and the KSK is in the "ready" state, then you can tell OpenDNSSEC about it. # ods-enforcer key list -v Keys: Zone: Keytype: State: Date of next transition (to): Size: Algorithm: CKA_ID: Repository: Keytag: mytld KSK ready waiting for ds-seen (active) 2048 8 0c4f577032e04e2eb34163382a4524d7 SoftHSM 44096 mytld ZSK active 2014-03-21 07:54:38 (retire) 1024 8 bbd9b3e14c3cbb0517d49f79985916bd SoftHSM 57634 mytld ZSK publish 2014-03-21 09:02:55 (ready) 1024 8 7982538186c1b77afe84e6875f3c7bda SoftHSM 51991 -v gives you the key ids, which you will need for the next step. Note the keyid of the KSK, which is in `ready` state. Now, do: # ods-enforcer key ds-seen --zone mytld --keytag 44096 ... where 44096 is the keyid of the KSK in the example above. You will see: Found key with CKA_ID 0c4f577032e04e2eb34163382a4524d7 Key 0c4f577032e04e2eb34163382a4524d7 made active Notifying enforcer of new database... Performed a HUP ods-enforcerd Ok, look at the keys again: # ods-ksmutil key list Note that the KSK is now marked active.