


Introduction to Routing Security

Practical Cybersecurity for Internet Operators (PCIO)



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Routing Security

- Routing Security best practices have been considered vital for the Internet's operation since the mid-1990s
- Now has a catchy title (Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security aka MANRS), but the fundamentals are the same
- Implement the MANRS recommendations:
 - Prevent propagation of incorrect routing information
 - Prevent traffic with spoofed source addresses
 - Facilitate communication between network operators
 - Facilitate validation of routing information



MANRS



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Routing Security

- Prevent propagation of incorrect routing information
 - Make sure your clients are only announcing their address space to you
 - Verify that it is indeed their address space and their ASN
 - If it is not listed in the RIR databases as theirs, do **NOT** route it
 - Make sure you are only announcing your and your clients' address space to upstreams and peers
 - Make sure you only accept prefixes you expect from your peers
 - Make sure you do not allow unassigned or reserved addresses and ASNs
- This means:
 - Filter **ALL** EBGP sessions
 - Be aware: most BGP implementations are **permissive** by default



Routing Security

- Prevent traffic with spoofed source addresses
 - We have had a tool for this since the late 1990s – it is called “Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding” and is implemented in the hardware of router platforms
 - Do **NOT** buy access routers that cannot do uRPF regardless of what the vendor tells you
 - uRPF must be implemented on all edge facing interfaces, whether access customers, datacentre customers, wireless customers,...
 - Implementing uRPF will go a long way to help global efforts to deal with the menace of denial-of-service attacks
 - How good is your network?
 - <https://www.caida.org/projects/spoofers/>



Routing Security

- Facilitate communication between network operators
 - Know how to get hold of the NOC of your peers and upstreams
 - Make sure you have a PeeringDB entry
 - If you have an ASN, create an entry, even if you aren't at a peering point or a data centre – it is visibility!
 - Make sure your organisation's technical contact details are up to date for your IP address and ASN holdings at your RIR (Route and AS-Objects)
 - Take part in your local network operator group/online network forum
 - Don't hide away, and then expect the world to help you when you have a problem



Routing Security

- Facilitate validation of Routing information
 - Route Origin Authorisation has been available and deployable since 2013
 - All entities with IP address holdings must sign their ROAs
 - The ROA is a cryptographically signed object linking the IP address being announced to the ASN originating it.
 - Network operators are widely encouraged to drop invalid ROAs
 - This is a route which has either the incorrect origin ASN or incorrect subnet size when compared with existing ROAs
 - Many operators drop invalids, more need to – this is called Route Origin Validation
 - This stops incorrect announcements from appearing and propagating across the Internet routing system



Practical Routing Security

- We will now look at:
 - Interior routing protocol best practices
 - Key components of BGP
 - Securing the Router
 - BGP Best Current Practices
 - uRPF
 - RTBH
 - RPKI, ROAs and ROV



ISIS vs OSPF vs EIGRP vs RIPv2

IGP BEST PRACTICES



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Making choices

- An Interior routing protocol (IGP) is used within a network so that routers in that network can find each other and distribute internal prefixes
- There are four IGPs:
 - ISIS
 - Widely used by Internet network operators, built-in multi-protocol support, the IGP of choice
 - OSPF
 - IETF standard routing protocol. OSPFv2 for IPv4, OSPFv3 for IPv6.
 - EIGRP
 - Proprietary to Cisco. Do not use unless vendor lock-in is your goal
 - RIPv2
 - Do not use, under any circumstances. Obsolete, does not scale



OSPF

- Open Shortest Path First
- Open:
 - Meaning an Open Standard, developed by IETF (OSPF Working Group)
 - OSPFv2 (RFC2328) for IPv4, OSPFv3 (RFC5340) for IPv6
- Shortest Path First:
 - Edsger Dijkstra's algorithm for producing shortest path tree through a graph
 - Dijkstra, E. W. (1959). "A note on two problems in connexion with graphs". Numerische Mathematik 1: 269–271
 - <http://www-m3.ma.tum.de/foswiki/pub/MN0506/WebHome/dijkstra.pdf>



IS-IS

- Intermediate System to Intermediate System
- ISO 10589 specifies OSI IS-IS routing protocol for ConnectionLess-mode Network Services (CLNS) traffic
 - A Link State protocol with a 2-level hierarchical architecture
 - Type/Length/Value (TLV) options to enhance the protocol
 - Runs on top of the Data Link Layer
 - Uses Dijkstra's SPF algorithm
- RFC 1195 added IP support (called Integrated IS-IS)
- RFC 5308 added IPv6 support



IS-IS & OSPF: Similarities

- Both are Interior Gateway Protocols (IGP)
 - They distribute routing information between routers belonging to a single Autonomous System (AS)
 - Both use Edsger Dijkstra's algorithm
- With support for:
 - Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR)
 - Variable Subnet Length Masking (VLSM)
 - Authentication
 - Multi-path
 - IP unnumbered links



For Service Providers

- Which IGP should an ISP choose?
 - Both OSPF and IS-IS use Dijkstra SPF algorithm
 - Exhibit same convergence properties
 - IS-IS less widely implemented on router platforms
 - IS-IS runs on data link layer, OSPF runs on IP layer
- Why do we keep discussing the merits of each IGP?



For Service Providers

- Biggest ISPs tend to use IS-IS – why?
 - In early 1990s, Cisco implementation of IS-IS was much more stable and reliable than OSPF implementation – ISPs naturally preferred IS-IS
 - Main IS-IS implementations are more tuneable than equivalent OSPF implementations
 - Because biggest ISPs using IS-IS put more pressure on Cisco to implement “knobs” to improve performance



For Service Providers

- Moving forward a decade
 - Early Cisco OSPF implementation substantially rewritten
 - Now competitive with IS-IS in features and performance
 - Router vendors wishing a slice of the core market need an IS-IS implementation as solid and as flexible as that from Cisco
 - Those with IS-IS & OSPF support tend to ensure they exhibit performance and feature parity



How to choose an IGP?

- OSPF
 - Rigid area design – all networks must have area 0 core, with sub-areas distributed around
 - Suits ISPs with central high speed core network linking regional PoPs
- IS-IS
 - Relaxed two level design – L2 routers must be linked through the backbone
 - Suits ISPs with “stringy” networks, diverse infrastructure, etc, not fitting central core model of OSPF
 - More flexible than OSPF, but easier to make mistakes too



Considerations

- “Security”
 - IS-IS runs on link layer
 - Not possible to directly “attack” IS-IS using IP
- Not dependent on IP addressing
 - IS-IS’s NSAP addressing scheme avoids dependencies on IP as with OSPF
- “Reliability”
 - IS-IS has long been used by the majority of the world’s biggest ISPs
 - Belief that equipment vendors pay more attention to IS-IS reliability, scalability, and features



More considerations

- Migration to IPv6
 - Adding IPv6 means OSPFv2 and OSPFv3 in network
 - Two independent protocols, two sets of identical configuration
 - IS-IS simply requires the addition of the IPv6 address-family
 - Note that RFC5838 describes support of multiple address families in OSPFv3
 - Limited vendor support
 - Is not compatible with OSPFv2



Securing the IGP

- Only use IGP on internal interfaces
 - Not on customer or peer or transit interfaces
- Only use IGP for carrying internal prefixes
 - Internal point to point link addresses
 - Internal loopback (management) addresses
- Use adjacency/neighbour authentication
 - No adjacency established otherwise
- Use scalability and performance recommendations developed by the Internet industry
 - Vendor “out of the box” defaults are never sufficient

Deploying BGP with scalability and security

KEY COMPONENTS OF BGP



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


Border Gateway Protocol

- A Routing Protocol used to exchange routing information between different networks
 - Exterior gateway protocol
- Described in RFC4271
 - RFC4276 gives an implementation report on BGP
 - RFC4277 describes operational experiences using BGP
- The Autonomous System is the cornerstone of BGP
 - It is used to uniquely identify networks with a common routing policy



Autonomous System (AS)



- Collection of networks with same routing policy
- Single routing protocol
- Usually under single ownership, trust and administrative control
- Identified by a unique 32-bit integer (ASN)



Autonomous System Number


32-bit range representation specified in RFC5396

Defines “asplain” (traditional format) as standard notation

Range:	
0-4294967295	(32-bit range – RFC6793)
	(0-65535 was original 16-bit range)
Usage:	
0 and 65535	(IANA Reserved)
1-64495	(public Internet)
64496-64511	(documentation – RFC5398)
64512-65534	(private use only)
23456	(represent 32-bit range in 16-bit world)
65536-65551	(documentation – RFC5398)
65552-131071	(IANA Reserved)
131072-458751	(public Internet)
458752-4199999999	(IANA Reserved/Unallocated)
4200000000-4294967294	(private use only – RFC6996)
4294967295	(IANA Reserved – RFC7300)



BGP Basics



- Runs over TCP – port 179
- Path vector protocol
- Incremental updates
- “Internal” & “External” BGP
- Supports IPv4 & IPv6

BGP General Operation

- Learns multiple paths via internal and external BGP speakers
- Picks the best path and installs it in the routing table (RIB)
- Best path is sent to external BGP neighbours
- Policies are applied by influencing the best path selection




Constructing the Forwarding Table

- BGP “in” process
 - Receives path information from peers
 - Results of BGP path selection placed in the BGP table
 - “best path” flagged
- BGP “out” process
 - Announces “best path” information to peers
- Best path stored in Routing Table (RIB) if:
 - Prefix and prefix length are unique (after best path selection)
 - and
 - Lowest “protocol distance”
- Best paths in the RIB are installed in forwarding table (FIB)



Constructing the Forwarding Table



Supporting Multiple Protocols

- Independent operation
 - One RIB per protocol
 - IPv6 routes in BGP's IPv6 RIB
 - IPv4 routes in BGP's IPv4 RIB
 - Each protocol can have its own policies
- NEXTHOP
 - The IP address of the next router must belong to the same address family as that of the local router



Supporting Multiple Protocols

- Cisco IOS assumes that all BGP neighbours will exchange IPv4 unicast prefixes
 - Most other implementations do not
 - We need to remove this assumption in Cisco IOS

```
router bgp 64500
no bgp default ipv4-unicast
```

- For operational simplicity, the desire is for:
 - IPv4 neighbours to exchange IPv4 unicast prefixes
 - IPv6 neighbours to exchange IPv6 unicast prefixes
- Failure to do this results in:
 - IPv6 neighbours appearing to be set up to exchange IPv4 unicast prefixes
 - Cluttered configuration, confusing troubleshooting and diagnosis




EBGP & IBGP

- BGP is used
 - Internally (IBGP)
 - Externally (EBGP)
- IBGP used to carry
 - Some/all Internet prefixes across network operator backbone
 - ISP's customer prefixes
- EBGP used to
 - Exchange prefixes with other ASes
 - Implement routing policy




BGP/IGP model used in service provider networks

- Model representation



External BGP Peering (EBGP)



- Between BGP speakers in different AS
- Should be directly connected
- Never run an IGP between EBGP peers




Internal BGP (IBGP)

- BGP peer within the same AS
- Not required to be directly connected
 - IGP takes care of inter-BGP speaker connectivity
- IBGP speakers must be fully meshed:
 - They originate connected networks
 - They pass on prefixes learned from outside the AS
 - They do not pass on prefixes learned from other IBGP speakers




Internal BGP Peering (IBGP)



- Topology independent
- Each IBGP speaker must peer with every other IBGP speaker in the AS as per \longleftrightarrow

Peering between Loopback Interfaces



- Peer with loop-back interface
 - Loop-back interface does not go down – ever!
- Do not want IBGP session to depend on state of a single interface or the physical topology

Inserting prefixes into BGP

- Two ways to insert prefixes into BGP
 - *redistribute static*
 - Static route must exist before *redistribute* command will work
 - Care required – *redistribute* will move everything from the named protocol into BGP unless filters are applied
 - *network* command
 - A matching route must exist in the routing table before the network is announced



Practical Routing Security

- Summary:
 - MANRS
 - Interior routing protocol best practices
 - Key components of BGP
 - Securing the Router
 - BGP Best Current Practices
 - uRPF
 - RTBH
 - RPKI, ROAs and ROV



Questions/Discussion?

